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Beyond Borders: An Ecosystem
Approach to Environmental
Regulation
INTRODUCTION
The maxim "pollution knows no boundary" is nothing new.
People have tried to manage the environment and its natural
resources by the specific ecosystem in which those resources are
found for the last hundred years. 1  In fact, this so-called
"ecosystem approach" to environmental regulation can be found in
Aldo Leopold's writings on conservation biology and in even
earlier works by transcendentalists like Henry David Thoreau.2
Moreover, since the 1890's scientists have moved away from
traditional zoological approaches to studying natural resources. 3
For example, during the late 19th century scientists began
analyzing the habitats of fish species and the relationship of
population dynamics to the physical environment. 4 What is
troubling about this long history of an "ecosystem approach" to
environmental management is that it has not yet been
incorporated into our legal system. A brief history of
environmental law shows that prior to the 1970's, limited state
laws and common law nuisance actions handled most
environmental protection. 5  Ironically, handling environmental
1. Harry N. Scheiber, From Science to Law to Politics: An Historical
View of the Ecosystem Idea and Its Effect on Resource Management, 24
ECOLOGY L. Q. 631, 634-35 (1997).
2. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO FISH AND
WILDLIFE CONSERVATION (April 19, 1996), http://www.fws.gov/policy/
052fwl.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
3. Scheiber, supra note 2, at 636.
4. Id.
5. Jonathan H. Alder, When is Two A Crowd? The Impact of Federal
Action on State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 67
(2007).
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matters through common law nuisance actions may have been the
closest thing to a legal "ecosystem approach" because at least with
nuisance actions the problem is being addressed at the source.
Nevertheless, the general perception that states were unable to
address most environmental concerns led Congress to create an
array of environmental statutes where the federal government
assumed the dominant role in policy-making. 6 However, since the
enactment of these statues, many scholars have called for reform
of environmental laws, but few have considered the "ecosystem
approach" or even paid attention to the organization of the
agencies making the laws themselves.7
As a result of this inherent lack of consideration for
ecosystem-based environmental management, it is necessary to
discuss what alternatives are available. Let us consider the
feasibility of a decentralization of federal environmental agencies
through the adoption of an inter-jurisdictional, eco-regional
approach to environmental policy-making. Because the term
"environmental law" encompasses such a wide range of legal
matters, this article will focus on only a few environmental areas,
namely water and coast line regulation. More specifically, the
focus is narrowed to how the current over-delegation of federal
authority under the Clean Water Act leads not only to uncertainty
as to what the regulations are, but also to inefficiency and
frustration among the states. As a means of illustration, a
hypothetical will be used where "State A" is proposing to build a
liquefied natural gas receiving facility, which involves dredging of
a marina and filling of a wetland; activities which require Clean
Water Act permits. First however, this article will inform the
unfamiliar reader about liquefied natural gas, and then set out
the hypothetical of State A in more detail. Next, there will be a
detailed, though by no means all-inclusive, explanation of the
permitting process for building State A's proposed facility. If
anything, the lesson to take from these sections is that the current
system in place is complicated and at best confusing. Finally, the
"heart" of the article consists of a detailed discussion of
6. Id.
7. Paul S. Weiland & Robert 0. Vos, Reforming EPA's Organizational
Structure: Establishing an Adaptable Agency Through Eco-Regions, 42 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 91, 92 (2002).
BEYOND BORDERS
alternatives to the current system of a federal-based regulation
under the Clean Water Act.
Ultimately, the overarching goal is to demonstrate that the
decentralization of federal-based environmental regulations is not
only feasible but that the system currently in place could easily
allow for the necessary transition. Now is the time to reunite law
with science and the historical trend of ecosystem management
that scientists have followed for over the past century. 8
A BRIEF OVERVIEW ON LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS
Liquefied natural gas (LNG), as the name suggests, is natural
gas converted into a liquid by being cooled below its boiling point
to approximately -2590F.9 Being cooled to this temperature causes
the LNG to be about 1/600th the volume of natural gas, thus
making it more cost-effective for long-distance transportation and
storage. 10 Given the fact that the largest natural gas reserves are
now found in Russia and the Middle East, LNG also provides an
efficient means of transporting this fuel to places where
traditional pipelines cannot.11 An additional benefit of LNG is
that it produces fewer emissions and pollutants than coal or oil
such that it is considered a "cleaner source of energy. 12
Furthermore, the Energy Information Administration forecasts
the demand for natural gas will grow by approximately 40 percent
by the year 2025 and consumption of natural gas is expected to
outpace domestic production. 13 Thus, LNG imports can provide a
means for making up for this shortfall. 14
And now for the bad news... LNG transportation is not cheap
because it requires a liquefaction facility, where the gas is cooled
and converted to liquid, a "load-out" terminal for loading the LNG
onto ships, special LNG ships for the long-distance transportation,
8. Scheiber, supra note 2, at 635.
9. David MacDuffee & Patricia Delgado, Liquefied Natural Gas: A
Primer on Needs, Regulations, Environmental Implications and Trends, 27.3
THE COASTAL SOCIETY BULLETIN 1 (2005), available at
http://www.thecoastalscociety.orgbuilletin.html.
10. Id.
11. Id. at4.
12. Id. at 1.
13. Id. at 4.
14. Id.
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and a "regasification" terminal to reheat the LNG and revert it to
a gas. 15 Furthermore, prior to building a LNG regasification
terminal a federal license is required under the Natural Gas Act. 16
Another inherent hurdle to overcome is that, as with any major
federal project that has the potential of affecting the environment,
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)17 is triggered.
Under NEPA all federal agencies are required to prepare an
"Environmental Impact Statement" for every "recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."18
This "Environmental Impact Statement" (EIS) is not something
trivial and will not survive judicial review unless the responsible
agency proves that it has fully considered the detailed EIS "at
every important stage in the decision making process." 19
However, by delving further into the process of building a LNG
regasification facility, it quickly becomes apparent that NEPA
may be the smallest hurdle to jump.
STATE A's HYPOTHETICAL LNG DILEMMA
Putting NEPA aside for a moment, let us assume that State A
wants to build a liquefied natural gas (LNG) regasification facility
along the inland coast of a river connecting to the ocean. Because
of the inherent need for ships to get in and out of the terminal,
State A plans to dredge a channel up to the facility, a marina, and
a turn-around area. Moreover, given the fact that coastline is
such a commodity and the inherent NIMBY (Not In My Back
Yard) attitude of residents towards such facilities, the only
available land for the facility is comprised of wetlands, which were
previously thought to be "unusable." Thus, in order to build on
this land, State A plans to fill the wetlands with the dredged
material being taken out of the waterway when it constructs the
channel, marina, and turn-around facility. To complicate matters
further, now assume that the mouth of the river, which connects
to the ocean, is in State B, such that the LNG ships will have to
15. Id. at 1.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2000).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2000).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000).
19. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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travel through the waters of State B to get to the LNG facility in
State A. While studies show that no actual dredging is necessary
in State B, the State is deeply concerned about the effects of
constructing the facility. State B, known for its fishing industry
and already under pressure by its residents for the dramatic
decrease in winter flounder, fears the upstream dredging and the
increase in ship traffic will have detrimental affects on the local
fish populations. Accordingly, we are now faced with the issues of
whether State A will be able to construct its LNG facility, what
steps must State A take in order to do so, and finally whether
State B has any rights in protecting its interests.
The best starting point in solving the issues of this
hypothetical is to consider which agency regulates the necessary
dredging and filling that State A must perform in order to
construct its LNG facility. Although it may seem unusual to one
unfamiliar with environmental law, the agency in charge of
dredging and filling is in fact the Army Corps of Engineers (Army
Corps). To understand why the Army Corps is the agency in
charge, one must first note that the Congressional power to
regulate commerce under Article I of the United States
Constitution includes the power to regulate navigation and this
includes navigable waters. 20 Congress gave this power to regulate
navigable waters to the Secretary of the Army, who in turn
delegated it to the Army Corps.21 More specifically, under the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, which the Army Corps is in
charge of, it is unlawful to "excavate or fill, or in any manner to
alter or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity" of the
navigable waters of the United States without authorization from
the Army Corps.22 Thus, it makes sense that State A should
consult with the Army Corps if it is planning to build a channel,
marina, and turn-around area.
However, the Army Corps' role in this permitting process does
not stop here, as they also have obligations to deal with discharges
of dredged materials under § 404 of the Clean Water Act.23 Under
20. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
21. Thomas Addison & Timothy Burns, Comment, The Army Corps of
Engineers and Nationwide Permit 26: Wetlands Protection or Swamp
Reclamation, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 624 (1991).
22. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000).
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
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§ 404, the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Army Corps,
"may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public
hearing for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters at specific disposal sites."24 As an aside, it is
critical to understand the difference between § 10 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899 and § 404 of the Clean Water Act. Here,
the main point is that § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
regulates the actual act of dredging or filling, while § 404 of the
Clean Water Act regulates the discharges that result from these
activities. Although it sounds confusing and even trivial, the
difference between dredging or filling and the discharge of
dredged or filled material is an important point to distinguish.
For example, if one were to fill in a stream on one's property with
dirt so as to increase the amount of land, that would constitute a
"filling." On the other hand, the excess affluent that runs
downstream and into a river as a result of that filling would
constitute a "discharge." Unfortunately, this point makes State
A's permitting process even more difficult because, if we recall, the
state is not only dealing with dredging out the channel, marina,
and turn-around area, but it also has to fill the wetlands on which
it plans to build a marina. Ultimately, this creates a high
likelihood that at least one of these activities will result in some
form of "discharge," requiring a permit under § 404 of the Clean
Water Act.
Recall from the hypothetical that in order to construct the
LNG facility, State A needs to fill an area of wetlands. This
classification as a wetland only adds to the confusion because laws
governing wetlands are complicated at best. To begin, the
precedent in Gibbons v. Ogden25 shows the Constitution's
Commerce Clause 26 gives the federal government jurisdiction over
the "navigable waters of the United States." However, defining
these "navigable waters" has proven to be no easy task. Moreover,
determining whether the definition of "navigable waters" applies
to wetlands further complicates the already complicated. At first,
in United States v. Riverside Bayview, the United States Supreme
Court upheld the Army Corps' definition of the term "navigable
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000).
25. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 10.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
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waters" to include all wetlands adjacent to navigable waters,
"even if not inundated or frequently flooded by navigable water."27
However, this sweepingly broad definition of navigable waters has
since been limited by two important cases: Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers28
(hereinafter "SWANCC') and Rapanos v. United States.29  In
SWANCC, the United States Supreme Court held the extension of
the definition of navigable waters to intrastate waters used as
habitat by migratory birds exceeded the Army Corps' authority
under the Clean Water Act.30 Here, the Army Corps asserted
jurisdiction over abandoned sand and gravel pits through a so-
called "Migratory Bird Rule," which protected wetlands serving as
seasonal ponds for migratory birds.31 In spite of this, the Court
reasoned that the Migratory Bird Rule was inconsistent with the
Army Corps' definition of "navigable waters," because those
waters were not subject to the ebb and flow of the tides, nor were
they used or susceptible for use in commerce. 32
Continuing with the trend of limiting the Federal
Government's jurisdiction over wetlands, Rapanos was the next
Supreme Court case that tried to define the term "navigable
waters." In Rapanos, the plurality held "navigable waters" are
only those waters that are "relatively permanent, standing or
continuously flowing bodies of water forming geographic features
that are described in ordinary parlance as steams, oceans, rivers,
and lakes."33 As if that definition was not complicated enough, in
his concurrence Justice Kennedy argued for a "significant nexus"
test whereby the body of water should be looked at on a case-by-
case basis to determine whether there is a hydrological connection
to a body of water that is navigable-in-fact. 34 Thus, the present
definition of "navigable waters" is murky. . . pun intended.
Accordingly, for the time being, State A should, at a bare
27. United States v. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985).
28. See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (hereinafter "SWANCC").
29. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
30. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
31. Id. at 167.
32. Id. at 168.
33. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732-33.
34. Id. at 784-85.
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minimum, determine whether the wetlands it wishes to fill have a
"significant nexus" to navigable waters, which would subject them
to federal regulation and thus require permits from the Army
Corps.
A. Confusion over the Tulloch Rule
If one assumes that a "significant nexus" is found between the
wetlands, which need to be filled and a navigable water, then
State A must receive permits from the Army Corps under the
Rivers and Harbors Act and perhaps under § 404 of the Clean
Water Act. "Perhaps" is italicized in the last sentence because
determining the scope of the § 404 permit is problematic. In
particular, there is an issue with whether § 404 extends to the
dredging activities required for building the channel. From 1986
until 1993 the Army Corps broadly defined the discharge of
dredged material as "any addition of dredged material into the
waters of the United States," but also expressly excluded "de
minimus, incidental soil movement occurring during normal
dredging operations." 35 This definition remained in effect until
1993, when the Tulloch rule was created through North Carolina
Wildlife Federation v. Tulloch, in which a North Carolina
Developer used sophisticated dredging techniques to prevent any
discharge of dredged material in an attempt to develop 700 acres
of wetlands without a § 404 permit.36 As a result of such large-
scale development of wetland areas, environmental groups sued
the Army Corps, the EPA, and the landowners, alleging the
activities were subject to a § 404 permit.37  This case was
eventually settled by the Army Corps and the EPA, who agreed to
revise the term "discharge of dredged material" to include "any
addition or redeposit of dredged materials, including the
excavated materials removed during a dredging activity."38
Accordingly, the new definition for "discharge of dredged material"
became known as the Tulloch rule, which required § 404 permits
35. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 01-
0274 (JR), 2007 WL 259944, at *1 (D. D.C. Jan. 30, 2007).
36. See Am. Mining Cong. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 951 F. Supp.
267, 269 (D.D.C. 1997) (citing North Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Tulloch, Civil
No. C90-713-CIV-5-BO (E.D.N.C. 1993)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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for nearly all dredging activities, including those only involving
the incidental fallback of dredged material coming off of a
dredging device and falling back into the same place from which it
was removed.39
Given that this new regulation sought to control all dredging
and filling activities, it did not take long before the Tulloch rule
was challenged. In American Mining Congress v. U.S. Army Corp
of Engineers, the court held the Tulloch rule exceeded the scope of
the EPA and Army Corps' statutory authority.40 While American
Mining Congress was decided in 1997, it was not until 2001 that a
new regulation was issued; commonly referred to as "Tulloch II. ''41
Under this new rule, the agencies regarded the use of mechanized
earth-moving equipment for dredging purposes as a discharge of
dredged material unless there was project-specific evidence
showing the activity only resulted in incidental fallback.4 2
However, like its predecessor, "Tulloch If' has been challenged as
exceeding the scope of the EPA and Army Corps' statutory
authority. 43 Accordingly, the two agencies are still rewriting the §
404 regulations on how to handle dredging activities that only
cause incidental fallback.
Unfortunately for State A, even if it does get approval from
the Army Corps to dredge and fill, its Clean Water Act permitting
process is far from over. For example, the LNG regasification
facility may need to use an "open rack vaporization" (ORV) system
to use heat from seawater to warm and regasify LNG. 44 The
problem with ORV systems is they require a continuous supply of
seawater, which gets discharged at a much colder temperature.4 5
This discharge, in turn, can require a separate "National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System" (NPDES) permit under § 402 of
the Clean Water Act.4 6 NPDES permits are a technology-based
39. Id. at 270.
40. Id. at 271.
41. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corp of Eng'rs, 440
F.3d 459, 462-63 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
42. Id.
43. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 01-
0274 (JR), 2007 WL 259944, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2007).
44. MacDuffee, supra note 10, at 5-11.
45. See id.
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
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standard that requires a permit for an addition of a pollutant from
a point source into navigable water. 47 In this case, the Clean
Water Act defines "pollutant" to include heat,48 so it is not a
stretch to assume that the discharge of cold water would be seen
as a "pollutant," especially because it could be harmful to marine
life around the facility.49 Furthermore, State A's facility meets
the definition of "point source," which the EPA defines as "as
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance. . . from which
pollutants are or may be discharged. ''50 Classifying the LNG
facility as a "point source," coupled with the fact that the cold
water the facility discharges may constitute a "pollutant," may
trigger § 402 permit requirements for the LNG regasification
facility. Accordingly, the possibility that State A will be required
to obtain a NPDES permit from the EPA, in addition to the § 404
permit that it must obtain from the Army Corps, creates an
additional hurdle standing in the way of constructing the LNG
facility.
B. Don't Forget about B...
Assuming that State A is somehow capable of meeting all of
its permitting requirements under the Clean Water Act and the
Rivers and Harbors Act,51 the next issue would be whether State
B can do anything to protect its interests. As mentioned above,
State B could argue the dredging and filling activities result in a
discharge into its navigable waters and try to require State A to
apply for a separate NPDES permit under § 402 of the Clean
Water Act.52 This option is extremely attractive because § 402(b)
of the Act allows a state to obtain the authority to issue its own
NPDES permits. 53 Thus, if State B could argue the dredging and
filling activities are "pollution" from a "point source," it could
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2000).
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000).
49. See MacDuffee supra note 10, at 5.
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000).
51. Recall that this article is only dealing with a limited number of
statutory regulations. Accordingly, State A's permitting obligations are by no
means limited to only the Clean Water Act and Rivers and Harbors Act.
However, for brevity's sake, the other necessary permits shall be excluded
from this discussion.
52. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
53. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000).
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obtain the authority under § 402(b) of the Clean Water Act to
reject State A's permit to build the proposed LNG facility.
However, this option is not very feasible because the courts have
rejected attempts to define the "incidental fallback" that results
from dredging and filling activities as pollution.54 Moreover, if
one recalls from above, §402 permits only apply to "point
sources,"55 and State B would find it difficult to argue that broad
dredging and filling activities are a point source, as defined.
Accordingly, any attempt to require State A to obtain a NPDES
permit from State B for its dredging and filling activities would
most likely be unsuccessful.
If one assumes that State B's voice was effectively silenced
during the § 404 permitting process, the state, facing pressure to
act from its own citizens, may try to take more drastic measures
in order to stop the construction of State A's LNG facility. One
such option may be to look for an endangered species living in the
area that would be threatened by the facility's construction.
Under § 9 of the Endangered Species Act it is unlawful for any
"person," a term which includes federal governments and private
parties, to "take" an endangered species of fish or wildlife. 56
Furthermore, the term "take" is defined as "to harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to
attempt to engage in any such conduct. ' 57 Thus, if State B could
show there is an endangered species in the area which could
possibly be injured by State A's conduct, it may be able to stop the
construction of the LNG facility. This argument is not
improbable, considering the Endangered Species Act has a history
of stopping the construction of major projects; the presence of a
small fish in a stream has stopped the construction of a dam,58
and the presence of a fly has even stopped the construction of a
54. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No.
01-0274 (JR), 2007 WL 259944, at *4 (D. D.C. Jan. 30, 2007).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2000).
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2000).
57. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000).
58. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978) (an
endangered species of fish, the snail darter, prevented the construction of the
Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River after over eighty million dollars
were already spent on the project).
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hospital.59 That being said, while discovery of an endangered
species may be able to stop the construction of the facility, such an
outcome would most likely be as probable as winning the lottery
when one considers the difficulty in actually finding the species in
the area and demonstrating that it is being harmed.
Nevertheless, there are still other problems that State A could
face during its construction of the LNG facility. One such problem
would be if the dredged material from the channel, marina and
turn-around area turned out to contain toxic materials. In this
hypothetical situation, State A would not only run into problems
of not being able to use the dredged material as fill for its
wetlands, but it would also have to comply with the expensive
obligations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA).60 Yet another important issue is whether the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), acting in conjunction
with the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard), would deny the
proposed site because the increased ship traffic would negatively
affect maritime safety or homeland security.61 To adequately
handle each of the problems mentioned above would require a
discussion as long as this article itself, but for the purposes of this
paper it suffices just to mention them. Ultimately, it quickly
becomes evident that there are numerous obstacles that State A
must face in order to build its proposed LNG facility. However,
instead of asking whether State A has met all of its necessary
requirements, this article questions whether this whole process
59. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1057
(C.A.D.C. 1997) (The construction of a county hospital was prevented because
the proposed building site was the only remaining habitat of the Delhi Sands
Flower-Loving Fly. This species of fly was native to only a small area of
dunes located in one county.)
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (2000) (The Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act authorizes the EPA to establish stringent regulations
controlling the generation, transport and disposal of hazardous and non-
hazardous wastes).
61. See Interagency Agreement Among the Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, U.S. Coast Guard, and Research Programs Admin. for the Safety
and Security Review of Waterfront Import/Export Liquefied Natural Gas
Facilities, Feb. 11, 2004. Pursuant to an interagency agreement among
FERC, the Coast Guard, and the Research Programs Administration, the
Coast Guard "is responsible for matters related to navigation safety, vessel
engineering and safety standards, and all matters pertaining to the safety of
facilities or equipment located in or adjacent to navigable waters up to the
last valve immediately before the receiving tanks." Id.
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could be handled in a more efficient manner.
C. Over-Delegation Debacle
By now, if one thing should be clear from this hypothetical, it
is that the current process of regulating inter-jurisdictional water
and coastal rights is difficult and perplexing. Both State A and
State B arguably have valid interests, which they want to protect;
State A, looking for a cheaper and cleaner source of energy, and
State B, trying to protect its fisheries and water quality.
However, somehow in the process of filling out and complying with
the numerous federal permits, it seems as if these issues get
skewed and the states are left entangled in an administrative
mess. Although the focus of this article is not to argue about the
shortcomings, if any, of administrative law, it appears as if the
current over-delegation of authority to numerous federal agencies
creates a major source of confusion in environmental law as well
as a lack of agency accountability. 62  This "over-delegation"
problem is not new and has even been criticized by the agencies
themselves, as one frustrated Army Corps official, speaking at a
conference on § 404 of the Clean Water Act expressed the belief
that § 404 was broken and could not be fixed until the authority
under that section was delegated solely to either the EPA or the
Corps, and not split between the two. 63 However, given the
current confusion in both regulating dredging and filling
activities, 64 and what areas even fall within the ambit of §4 04
jurisdiction,65 it appears that delegation to one agency will not
solve these problems. In fact, the trend of narrowing federal
jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act in cases like Rapanos,66
may be a sign that it is time to change. Perhaps it is time to
consider the concept of using cooperative programs among several
62. For an argument about the lack of accountability created by
delegation in administrative law See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT
RESPONSIBILITY 9-10, 126-129 (Yale Univ. Press 1993).
63. See GAO REP., WETLANDS: CORPS OF ENG'RS ADMIN. OF THE SECTION
404 PROGRAM (July 1988), available at
http://archive.gao.gov/d16t6/136780.pdf.
64. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No.
01-0274 (JR), 2007 WL 259944, at *1, 4 (D. D.C. Jan. 30, 2007).
65. See Rapanos v. U.S., 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006).
66. Id. at 2212.
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states or regional geographic initiatives to handle the difficult
problems that arise when dealing with inter-jurisdictional
environmental problems such as the ones that arose in State A's
hypothetical about building a LNG facility.
IS IT THE STATES' TURN Now?
What are the recent court decisions under the Clean Water
Act trying to tell us? If anything, one could argue that they are
expressing a need for states to take over complicated
environmental matters. In terms of regulating what activities
constitute a "discharge" of dredged material, the courts have as
recent as January 2007, told the Corps to create new regulations,
because their old ones exceeded their delegated authority.6 7
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Rapanos left the states uncertain
as to what wetlands, if any, are under federal jurisdiction,
admitting, "it is unfortunate that no opinion commands a majority
of the Court on precisely how to read Congress' limits on the reach
of the Clean Water Act."'68 Are we to read these cases as saying
that nothing can be done? Certainly, they have left the EPA and
Army Corps in the dark as to what these agencies can and cannot
regulate. But perhaps there is a silver lining to this current
environmental debacle. For example, a number of states are
dealing with the shortcomings of federal regulation by enacting
new laws, which address the "narrowing scope" of the Clean Water
Act and create state-level regulation for ecologically sensitive
areas such as wetlands. 69 However, one should not be too quick to
jump to the conclusion that this trend of increasing state
regulation is the panacea to all environmental regulation.
As states regain the "right" to control pollution under the
Clean Water Act, it is prudent to consider what are the alleged
benefits? One alleged benefit is that by narrowing federal
jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, states are forced to
implement their own policies, which in turn makes each state a
"laboratory" in the federalist system of policy experimentation. 70
67. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 2007 WL 259944, at *4.
68. Rapanos, 126 S.Ct. at 2236.
69. See Darren Springer, How States Can Help to Resolve the
Rapanos/Carabell Dilemma, 21 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 83, 85 (2007).
70. Id. at 84-85.
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In other words, by having all fifty states trying to solve similar
problems, more potential solutions will arise, and states will
simultaneously be able to learn from one another's mistakes.
Additionally, regulation on the State-level may allow each State to
tackle its own specific problems thus overcoming the one-size-fits-
all dilemma of regulation by a single entity. 71 However, we also
have to consider whether the burdens of state-by-state regulation
may outweigh the benefits.
While individual State regulation of areas typically controlled
under the Clean Water Act would have the ability to bring in
numerous methods of environmental protection, is this necessarily
a wise idea? One inherent problem with individual state-based
regulation is that environmental problems "cross human
boundaries," which in legal terms, means that there will be
jurisdictional problems. 7 2 These jurisdictional problems will come
to a head both in terms of health and in economic terms, as
"externalities."73  In the case of economics, states would worry
about "negative externalities," which occur when a party does not
bear all of the costs associated with that party's action.7 4 For
example, in the LNG facility hypo, State A, during the
construction of the facility, may stir up sediment that flows
downstream, negatively interfering with State B's water quality.
Thus, while this action may have no negative consequences for
State A, it could adversely affect State B. Another issue with
individual state regulation deals with the so-called "race to the
bottom" theory. 75 Under this theory, the desire of each State to
encourage economic investment leads to a "race" where each state
lowers its existing environmental standards as a means of
encouraging economic development and attracting investment. 7 6
While such a theory may seem callous, people forget that
environmental issues are only one of the many issues troubling
71. It has been argued that in some states the aggregate level of
environmental protection is lowered due to the existence of federal
regulations that discourage state environmental protection measures. See
Alder, supra note 6, at 81.
72. See Weiland, supra note 8.
73. Id. at 97.
74. Id.
75. Alder, supra note 6, at 79.
76. Id.
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state representatives; especially in times of financial depression.
Just as you can't have your cake and eat it too, environmental
issues are known to take a back seat to allegedly more pressing
issues. Accordingly, individual, state-based protection, with
nothing more, may be an inadequate means of accomplishing
necessary environmental protection.
Assuming that environmental protection fails on a
jurisdictional basis, it almost seems commonsensical that an inter-
jurisdictional approach to environmental regulation is the better
solution. The logical conclusion being that to overcome the
problems associated with human boundaries, it is necessary for
states to cooperate. 77 In fact, this conclusion has been made both
on the national level, with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
dividing the United States into 53 "eco-regions," 78 as well as on
the local level by governmental and non-governmental
organizations developing such programs as the Great Lakes
Information Network. 79 The key benefit of these programs is that
a system organized by eco-regions would diminish the problems
created by manmade jurisdictions.8 0 Furthermore, such programs
may also create greater public participation, as some theorists
posit that "a reduced scale of decision-making enhances the
participation of citizens. 81 However, if it is so seemingly obvious
that eco-regional programs are beneficial, then why are they not
already in place?
Arguably, one reason why inter-jurisdictional regulation of
eco-regions has yet to become the prominent means of
environmental protection is scientific uncertainty.8 2 Scientific
uncertainty poses at least three key problems that relate to
environmental regulation: (1) human knowledge of biotic nature is
incomplete; (2) human knowledge of natural processes is
incomplete; and (3) human knowledge of the implications of our
own technologies is incomplete.8 3 For example, if States A and B
propose to form a single eco-region, scientific uncertainty may still
77. Weiland, supra note 8, at 98.
78. Id. at 116-17.
79. Id. at 119.
80. Id. at 121-22.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 98.
83. Id. at 98-99.
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prevent the states from entering into an agreement. Arguably,
the construction of the LNG facility creates a faction between
scientists who disagree about the effects on the local fish pollution,
the ecosystem as a whole, and the environmental harms
associated with LNG energy production and, dare I say, global
climate change.
Even assuming that states can agree on all scientific aspects
of environmental regulation, there is still the question of who
funds the eco-regional program. Moreover, what happens when
one State accuses the other of enjoying all of the benefits of a clean
environment without paying for its share? The issue being hinted
at here is better known as "the tragedy of the commons," which
was famously set out in 1968 by Garret Hardin.84 For the
purposes of this article however, instead of using a "commons" let
us consider the river in our hypothetical that leads to the ocean.
If State A agrees to spend extra amounts of money, insuring that
its dredging and filling activities do not result in any discharge
downstream to State B's waters, what guarantee does State A
have that State B will contribute to the cause? Better yet, if State
A and State B both agree to enter into an eco-regional program to
protect the environment, what happens when State A suspects
that State B is not paying its share? It is possible that the issue of
"who pays" is enough to bring any eco-regional program crashing
to a halt.
To rebut this "tragedy of the commons" idea, perhaps we can
look at an eco-regional program that has been met with some
success, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). RGGI
was created in 2003 when New York Governor George Pataki sent
letters to other states, inviting them to join in a cap-and-trade
program to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from power plants. 8 5
By September 2003, nine of the states agreed to participate in the
plan, which was then put into full effect by October 2003.86 Thus,
84. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScI. 1243, 1244
(1968).
85. DALLAS BURTRAW, ET AL., ALLOCATION OF C02 EMISSION ALLOWANCES
IN THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM 1 (Resources for
the Future 2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/rff study_4_6_05.pdf;
see also, generally, http://www.rggi.org/about.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
86. BURTRAW, supra note 88, at 1; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative,
Frequently Asked Questions 1 (December 20, 2005), available at
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this brief example shows that even though not all eleven states
agreed to participate in the program, the potential for "free
riders," which is an obvious and inherent risk when regulating
green house gases, is not a death knell to an inter-jurisdictional
environmental enforcement action.
On the other hand, even if the eco-regional compact between
states A and B works flawlessly, there is still an issue of the states
curtailing the flow of pollutants so much that it implicates the
"dormant commerce clause. ''8 7  For example, the dormant
commerce clause has been used to invalidate a statute prohibiting
the importation of waste from out-of-state. 88 It has also been used
to invalidate a statute designed to channel solid waste through a
designated waste transfer station that would separate recyclable
items from non-recyclable items.89 Thus, acting without any
federal oversight, the dormant commerce clause may preclude
states from completely controlling the movement of not only
wastes, but also pollutants and natural resources across their eco-
region. 90
However, dormant commerce clause issues are not as easily
solved as simply instating "federal oversight." This is especially
true when we take into account the difficulties in getting all states
to agree on a remedy, as well as the Tenth Amendment's
limitations on congressional power. 91 In other words, with federal
oversight in eco-regional environmental regulation, there is the
risk that a state might bring a coercion action against the federal
government. Perhaps looking at an example taken from New York
v. United States better illustrates this point.92 In New York, the
Governors of several states agreed to take responsibility for the
disposal of their own low-level radioactive waste based on the
belief that it could be disposed of "most safely and efficiently... on
a regional basis."93  Nevertheless, the United States Supreme
Court held that while the Federal Government could hold out
http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou faqs_1220 05.pdf.
87. Weiland, supra note 8, at 127.
88. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
89. See C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994).
90. Weiland, supra note 8, at 127.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
92. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
93. Id. at 150-51.
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incentives to encourage states to adopt the regulatory scheme, it
could not direct states to provide for the disposal of radioactive
waste within their borders. 94 What is of particular interest here
is Justice White's dissenting commentary that the Act resulted
from interstate compromises by "state leaders to achieve a state-
based set of remedies" for radioactive waste problems, yet it was
held unconstitutional as federal coercion.9 5 Thus, Justice White
was troubled by the majority's decision because the Act was the
product of "cooperative federalism, in which the States bargained
among themselves to achieve compromises for Congress to
sanction." 96 Seemingly, what the states sought to achieve in New
York through the state-by-state regulation of its own radioactive
waste is very similar to the state-based approach, discussed above.
So, what lesson can environmentalists and lawmakers take from
New York?
As one has seen so far, many issues stem from regulation of
environmental problems both on a state and federal level. These
problems are only further complicated when one looks at the
opinion in New York, where the Supreme Court overruled a
seemingly valid compromise between various state governments
attempting to regulate the environmental problems associated
with nuclear waste. 97 However, read closely, the Supreme Court
in New York appears to provide some great advice for eco-regional
management systems. If one revisits the majority opinion, the
Court stated that the Federal Government could "hold out
incentives to the States as a means of encouraging them to adopt
suggested regulatory scheme." 98 Thus, "incentives" may be the
solution to problems inherent in state-based regulation. In other
words, what would happen if the federal government provided
"incentives," perhaps better known as "funding," to states that
enter into eco-regional protection agreements?
REGIONAL GEOGRAPHIC INITIATIVES
The provision of federal funding to states that agree to enter
94. Id. at 188.
95. Id. at 189-90 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 194.
97. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 188.
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into multi-jurisdictional, eco-regional protection programs seems
like a new and exciting idea. However, the old adage that "there
are no original ideas," proves true in this situation because the
EPA already implemented a program to provide financial support
through a "Regional Geographic Initiative" (RGI) fund. 99
According to the EPA's website the RGI fund is designed to "fund
unique, geographically-based projects that fill critical gaps in the
Agency's ability to protect human health and the environment." 100
In fact, the EPA's website reveals that the RGI program was
successful in funding 107 projects in the year 1998 alone. 101
However, further research into the RGI fund becomes somewhat
puzzling; it appears as if no projects have been funded since 1998.
An inquiry into this matter through a series of e-mail
correspondence with a regional EPA director was met with no
avail. Only through another author's confidential telephone
interview with an EPA Official was it revealed that the RGI effort
lasted only one year, with a total investment of just $2 million
being split among the ten regional offices of the EPA. 10 2
Apparently, the national program offices declined to participate
beyond the first year because of a "desire to hold the purse strings
more closely at headquarters."'10 3 Although this explanation
seems reasonable, maybe there is a different theory why this
program failed; the states never bought into it!
Speaking from a point of pure conjecture, it appears as if the
RGI program would fail because explicit in the program's
description is that "project[s] may receive funding for one or more
years but generally will not receive RGI funds for more than four
years."'1 4 While the RG1 program may have lofty goals of inciting
greater local public participation in environmental matters
through this initial influx of federal government funding, the lack
of continued government funding is extremely problematic. Like
99. EPA, REGIONAL GEOGRAPHIC INITIATIVE PROGRAM, http://www.epa.gov/
regional/rgi.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
100. Id.
101. EPA, REGIONAL GEOGRAPHIC INITIATIVE STORIES, http://www.epa.gov/
regional/highlightsfin.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
102. Weiland, supra note 8, at 124 n.114.
103. Id.
104. EPA, REGIONAL GEOGRAPHIC INITIATIVES, http://www.epa.gov/
regional/rgi.htm (last visited Feb 17, 2009) (emphasis added).
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the analogy of riding in a donkey cart, if the driver stops holding
the carrot in front of the donkey, the cart will eventually stop
moving and the driver will be left with one angry ass. In this case,
the federal government made it explicit that any "carrot" used to
get the states moving would be removed in four years or less.
Accordingly, states and even more importantly, local regions,
lacked any incentives to engage in regional programs when they
knew that the federal government would leave them to fund
expensive environmental programs on their own. With this in
mind it is important to question whether it is possible to salvage
an "RGI-like" program by providing a continued incentive for
states to engage in eco-regional protection of environmental
resources.
THE REBIRTH OF THE EPA & REGION GEOGRAPHIC INITIATIVES
While we know from New York that the federal government
cannot outright coerce State governments to act a certain way,
they can provide federal funding as an incentive.10 5  So
conceivably the answer lies in providing funding to those states
that delegate some part, if not all, of their environmental
regulatory authority to eco-regional organizations. Consequently,
the federal government would, in essence, adopt a "permanent"
RGI program simply by providing continued funding. In fact, this
idea does not seem so far-fetched when one considers the structure
already in place under the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA). 10 6 To be brief, under the CZMA, the federal government
provides funding to states that develop and administer coastal
programs according to federal guidelines set out under the Act.107
In other words, if the state wants to receive federal funding for
coastal zone management, it must first adopt regulations that are
in accordance with those approved by the federal government.
Thus, if one revisits the idea of RGI funding and compliments it
with the principles behind the CZMA, a new "hybridized" agency
can be created out of the EPA to enforce environmental matters on
an eco-regional basis.
As one continues to review this newfound balance between
105. New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
106. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1466 (2000).
107. See 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (2000).
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federal and state environmental regulation, the idea of a
decentralized EPA appears to have numerous benefits. One
theoretical positive is that the decentralization of leadership,
inevitable with the reorganization of the EPA by eco-regions,
would open up new management positions, thus creating more
opportunity of agency recruitment and advancement; in other
words, more jobs. 10 8 A second benefit to deregulation is the
potential that regulation by eco-region might foster greater
participation by the local citizens in policy decisions, 10 9 which in
turn could raise overall environmental awareness. And yet
another benefit would be that eco-regions might eventually make
greenhouse gas emissions trading programs more feasible by
clearly delineating specific trading regions." 0 While all of these
benefits seem well and good, one must also consider the
importance of maintaining some centrality.
It cannot be stressed enough that with decentralization, it is
still necessary to retain some form of a national office. One of the
most important rationales for retaining a national office is that
the office would play a critical role in gathering information from
across eco-regions, assess it, and then disseminate it back to the
regions."' Furthermore, some authors have reason to believe
that eco-regional based environmental protection could lead to
efforts by wealthy communities to keep out "locally unacceptable
land uses."112 Potentially, wealthier eco-regions, if left unchecked,
may promulgate regulations that force an unfair amount of
pollution-causing and environmentally deleterious activities to
occur in poorer areas. Thus, there is also a demand for a national
office as a means to prevent the "not in my back yard" (NIMBY)
problem." 3 Finally, there is some merit in maintaining a national
office to address difficult environmental problems that require an
across-the-board, "programmatic response," such as setting
108. Weiland, supra note 8, at 121.
109. Id. at 122-23.
110. Id. at 121-22.
111. Id. at 127.
112. Steven M. Meyer & David M. Konisky, The Origins of Community-
Based Environmental Protection: Evidence from the Massachusetts Wetlands
Protection Act, MASS. INST. OF TECH. DEPT. POL. Sci. 3 (Aug. 2005), available
at http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/meyer/ImpulseAugust05.pdf.
113. Weiland, supra note 8, at 127.
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standards for acceptable levels of toxins in drinking water. 114
Whatever the case may be, the complete decentralization of the
EPA is not the most prudent alternative, as a national office will
retain many important functions that simply cannot be taken over
on a regional basis.
CONCLUSION
If one returns to State A's LNG plant for a final time, what
would happen if the state had to apply to an eco-region for its
permit instead of numerous centralized national agencies? Would
the process be any easier? Arguably, regulation by eco-region
would allow for a broader and more detailed analysis of what the
regulations actually are and what rights states possess. The
recent trend of the courts to narrow the authority of the federal
agencies under the Clean Water Act in both Rapanos1 15 and
National Ass'n of Home Builders,116 demonstrates the current
level of confusion. Moreover, states are already undertaking
initiatives on a number of environmental challenges. 117 These
facts can realistically be seen as suggesting that it is feasible to
blend together state-based initiatives with federally managed
regimes to form inter-jurisdictional eco-regions. Such a demand
for this eco-regional regulatory approach is further illustrated by
looking at the LNG hypothetical and considering the interests of
State B. An eco-region approach would give State B much more
authority over the application for a permit to build the LNG
facility as well as the subsequent regulation of it. Instead of being
told that the state lacks jurisdiction because "the dredging and
filling occur outside of its boarders and the Army Corps regulates
such activities," regulation by a single eco-region compels the
regulating authority to consider the interests of State B. Thus,
because the eco-regional regulatory authority has jurisdictions
over an entire ecosystem opposed to merely a state border, the
concerned parties of State B are able to voice their opinions, add to
the overall amount of information taken into consideration, and
114. Id. at 128.
115. Rapanos v. U.S., 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006).
116. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 01-
0274 (JR), 2007 WL 259944 (D. D.C. Jan. 30, 2007).
117. Springer, supra note 72, at 83-4.
2009]
752 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:729
ensure that the most environmentally conscious outcome is
reached.
Hopefully this LNG hypothetical has demonstrated that
switching to an eco-regional based approach to environmental
regulation would not only provide the states with a greater voice
in important environmental issues, but would also create a more
efficient regulatory process. Furthermore, there is evidence
supporting the feasibility of such a system already present in
today's society. Signs of this transition may be seen as state
governments accept more environmental regulatory authority
each time the courts limit the scope of important federal statutes
like the Clean Water Act. However, it is not a matter of states
merely accepting responsibility for environmental matters but
rather it is what they do with their newfound power that is of the
greatest importance to the environment. Will the states finally
reconnect law with science by creating a system that embraces the
eco-system approach to environmental protection? Given the
inherent benefits of environmental regulation by eco-region, one
can only hope.
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